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Introduction
This paper investigates the relation that might exist between the timing of adoption of clean technologies, transboundary pollution and opening markets to international competition. Typical examples of clean production technologies are those using renewable energy such as solar energy, whereas polluting production technologies usually use fossil energy.
Many studies have been concerned with renewable energies and clean technologies. Dosi and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a …rm which can switch to a clean technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. To bridge the gap between the private and the policy-maker's desired timing of innovation, they recommended that the regulator stimulates the innovation by subsidies and by reducing the uncertainty concerning the pro…tability of the clean technology by appropriate announcements. These authors, Dosi and Moretto (2010) , extended the previous study to oligopolistic …rms and studied the incentives of not being the …rst …rm adopting the clean technology. Ben Youssef (2010) showed that the instantaneous regulated monopoly adopts the clean technology earlier than what is socially optimal, while the non-regulated monopoly adopts it later than what is socially optimal. The regulator can induce the monopoly to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal date by a postpone adoption subsidy. Reichenbach and Requate (2012) considered a model with two types of electricity producers and showed that a …rst-best policy requires a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for the renewable energy sources sector. Other theoretical studies have been interested in renewable energies and clean technologies such as Wirl Let us notice that many papers, not concerned with renewable energies, have studied the impact of international trade on pollution (Péchoux and Pouyet 2003, Cremer and Gahvari 2004) . Copeland and Taylor (1995) showed that uncoordinated regulation of pollution at the national level and free trade do not necessarily raise welfare.
Other studies have been interested in transboundary pollution (Hoel 1997 , Zagonari 1998 , Ben Youssef 2009 . Chander and Tulkens (1992) showed that non-cooperating behavior of countries is not Pareto-optimal. Mansouri and Ben Youssef (2000) showed the necessity of cooperation between countries to e¤ectively internalize all the transboundary pollution, while reaching the …rst best.
There is a rich literature that studied the timing of adoption of new technologies which are characterized by a lower production cost. We can cite Riordan (1992), Dutta et al. (1995) , Hoppe (2000) and Milliou and Petrakis (2011) . Reinganum (1981) showed that even in the case of identical …rms and complete information, there is di¤usion of innovation over time because one …rm innovates before the other and gains more. Making less severe conditions on the payo¤s of …rms than Reinganum (1981) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) showed that under certain conditions there is di¤usion of new technology adoption, whereas under other conditions …rms adopt the new technology simultaneously. Nonsimultaneous adoption is not the principal focus of the present paper, and we will impose conditions on model's parameters to eliminate the complicated case of non-simultaneous adoption of the new and clean technology.
Our paper di¤ers from the existing literature by the fact that we try to know how the adoption dates of clean technologies may be a¤ected when markets are opened to international competition, and how the regulator might change his behavior with respect to …rms he is regulating. Also, in the present paper, we study the relation between the adoption of clean technologies and transboundary pollution. These questions have not been tackled by previous literature.
We consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a monopolistic …rm operating in each country. Firms produce the same homogeneous good by using a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these …rms can adopt a new and clean production technology by incurring an investment cost. This clean technology does not pollute at all, uses a renewable energy and therefore has a lower unit production cost. Each …rm is regulated at each period of time, i.e., each non-cooperating regulator looks for static social optimality. A per-unit emission-tax is used when a …rm uses the polluting technology, and a per-unit production subsidy, which can be considered as a …scal incentive, is used when a …rm uses the clean technology. Before the beginning of the game, at date -1, regulators announce their per-unit emission tax and subsidy, and eventually their adoption subsidies. Then, at date 0, …rms choose their instantaneous production quantities and adoption dates. We study and compare the case where each …rm operates in a separate home market, and the case where there is international trade and …rms compete in the same market formed by consumers of the two countries.
In autarky, since our model is symmetric, …rms adopt the clean technology simultaneously. However, in a common market, and because of the competition between …rms, we impose a condition on model's parameters to avoid the complicated case where …rms adopt the clean technology at di¤erent dates, and we show that clean technology adoption is simultaneous.
When markets are opened to international competition, the per-unit emissiontax increases when the polluting technology is used, and the per-unit production subsidy decreases when the clean technology is used. These results are interesting and even surprising because it is naturally expected that, to give a competitive advantage to its domestic …rm, each regulator is tempted to reduce the per-unit emission-tax and to increase the per-unit production subsidy, when markets are opened to international trade. We do not get such expected results because regulators look for static social optimality, i.e., static …rst-best outcome.
Interestingly, the socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. It also better internalizes transboundary pollution compared with the optimal adoption date for …rms. Therefore, regulators should know how to intervene to induce …rms to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal date. This result is of great interest because this paper is the …rst attempt linking the adoption of clean technologies with transboundary pollution.
The intervention of regulators on how to induce …rms to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal adoption date completely changes when markets are opened to international competition. Indeed, in autarky (resp. a common market), …rms adopt earlier (resp. later) than what is socially optimal. Therefore, in autarky, regulators can induce the adoption of the clean technology at the socially optimal date by giving …rms a postpone adoption subsidy. However, in a common market, regulators can induce …rms to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal date by giving them a speed up adoption subsidy.
International competition reduces the instantaneous gain of …rms from using the clean technology as compared with that in autarky. Consequently, …rms delay the adoption of the clean technology when markets are opened to international trade. However, the instantaneous social welfare gain from the adoption of the clean technology increases with market opening, leading to an earlier socially optimal adoption date under a common market. Consequently, international trade leads to more global ‡ow of pollution when …rms are not incited to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal date. However, we have less global ‡ow of pollution when …rms are incited to adopt the clean technology at this last date. These results are new and interesting because the impact of opening markets to international competition on the timing of adoption of clean technologies has not been previously studied. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the autarky case. Section 3 deals with the common market case, and Section 4 compares the two market regimes. Section 5 concludes and an Appendix contains some proofs.
Autarky
We consider a symmetric model consisting of two countries and two …rms. Firm i located in country i is a regional monopoly and produces good i in quantity q i sold in the domestic market with the inverse demand function: p i = a 2q i ; a > 0: Thus, the market size of each country is a=2.
The consumption of q i engenders consumers'surplus in country i equal to:
At the beginning of the game, i.e., at date 0, …rms produce goods by using an old and polluting production technology using fossil fuels and characterized by a positive emission/output ratio e > 0. The pollution emitted by …rm i is
We suppose that pollution crosses the borders and that damages in country i are due to the domestic pollution and the foreign pollution:
where > 0 is the marginal damage cost of domestic pollution and > 0 is the marginal damage cost of foreign pollution. Thus, we use a simple and linear damage function. However, we think that our main results remain valid with a non-linear and convex damage function.
When …rm i uses the polluting technology, its unit production cost is d > 0 and its pro…t 1 is a id = p i (q i )q i dq i . Each …rm i behaves for an in…nite horizon of time and can adopt a new and clean production technology within a period of time i . This clean technology does not pollute at all, uses a renewable energy and therefore has a lower unit cost of production c verifying 0 < c < d. For example, we can consider that the polluting technology uses fossil energy, whereas the clean technology uses solar energy. The per-unit energy-production cost for the clean technology is for maintaining the solar production technology, and we can reasonably assume that it is lower than the per-unit energy-production cost when a fossil energy is used. Thus, the pro…t of …rm i is a ic = p i (q i )q i cq i . We suppose that the marginal damage of production e is neither too small nor too high and veri…es the following condition:
The instantaneous social welfare of country i is equal to consumers'surplus, minus damages plus the pro…t of the domestic …rm:
To get the new and clean production technology, an investment cost is necessary. This latter could comprise the R&D cost or the cost of acquisition and installation of the clean technology.
The cost of adopting the clean technology by …rm i at date i actualized at date 0 is:
with > 0 is the cost of immediate adoption of the clean technology, r > 0 is the discount rate, and the parameter m denotes that the cost of adoption decreases more rapidly when it is greater. We assume that m > 1. 2 As many studies (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, Hoppe 2000, Milliou and  Petrakis 2011), we assume that the current cost of adoption decreases overtime at a decreasing rate due to technical progress, i.e., (V ( i )e r i ) 0 < 0 and (V ( i )e r i ) 00 > 0: Let's remark that i = +1 means that …rm i will never adopt the clean technology.
Before the beginning of the game, at date -1, regulators announce their per-unit emission tax when the polluting technology is used, their per-unit production subsidy when the clean technology is used, and if they desire that …rms adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal adoption dates, they also announce their adoption subsidies. Then, at date 0, …rms choose their instantaneous production quantities before and after the adoption of the clean technology, and their adoption dates.
Instantaneous regulation
Being regional monopolies, …rms are regulated at each period of time. First, we start by determining the socially optimal production quantities for each regulator. Then, we determine the regulatory instruments inducing these socially optimal production quantities in each country.
When both …rms use the polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare of country i is:
Maximizing the expression given by (4) with respect to q i gives the socially optimal production level with the polluting technology for each regulator i = 1; 2:q a idd = a d e 2
We assume the …rst inequality of the following condition to get positive production quantities. Also, the second inequality is assumed to avoid studying the complicated case of non-simultaneous adoption of the clean technology in the common market case. Moreover, the second inequality of (1) assures that there is no contradiction in inequality (6):
Therefore, the maximum willingness to pay for the good must be higher than the marginal cost of production plus the marginal damage of production.
Since each …rm is a polluting monopoly, it is regulated. An emission-tax per-unit of pollution t a idd is su¢ cient to induce the socially-optimal levels of production and pollution.
The instantaneous net pro…t of …rm i is:
The socially optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces …rm i to producê q a idd is:
Using the expression ofq a idd , we can show that:
When e > d c 2 , i.e., the marginal damage of pollution is high enough, the above condition is always satis…ed and the emission-tax is positive. When e < d c 2 and a < d+2 e, the emission-tax is positive. However, when e < d c 2 and a > d + 2 e, i.e., the marginal damage of pollution is low enough, the emission-tax is negative meaning that each regulator subsidizes production to deal with monopoly distortion. If both …rms use the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare of country i is:
Maximizing the expression given by (10) with respect to q i gives the socially optimal production level with the clean technology for regulator i:
We haveq a icc >q a idd because d > c. Therefore, the clean technology enables to produce more without polluting the environment.
Since the production process is clean, each regulator gives his …rm a subsidy s a icc for each unit produced, which can be considered as a …scal incentive. One may think about the production of electricity. A per-unit production subsidy can be given by a regulator when the production process is clean (using solar energy, for example). Reichenbach and Requate (2012) considered a model with two types of electricity producers and showed that a …rst-best policy requires a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for the renewable energy sector. This per-unit subsidy is chosen to induce the socially optimal level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net pro…t of …rms i is:
The socially optimal per-unit subsidy that induces …rm i to produceq a icc is:
If we consider the case in which one of the two …rms, for example …rm 1; has adopted the clean technology, whereas …rm 2 still produces using the polluting technology, then the pro…ts of …rms are a 1cd (q 1 ) and a 2cd (q 2 ), respectively. The instantaneous social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 are:
Regulator i maximizes his social welfare function with respect to q i to get the socially optimal production quantities:
We can easily verify thatq a 1cd >q a 2cd meaning that it is socially preferred that the …rm using the clean technology produces more than that using the polluting technology.
Sinceq a 1cd =q a 1cc , regulator 1 can induce …rm 1 to produce the socially optimal production quantity by an appropriate subsidy s a 1cd = s a 1cc . Sinceq a 2cd = q a 2dd , a per-unit emission-tax t a 2cd = t a 2dd is needed to induce …rm 2 to produce the socially optimal quantity.
In the Appendix, we show that:
Thus, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under autarky, the instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is greater for the …rst adopter …rm than for its regulator.
Indeed, when a …rm adopts the clean technology, it no longer pays a pollution tax, receives production subsidies and its unit production cost decreases. This increases signi…cantly its instantaneous net pro…t. The instantaneous social welfare level increases due to the absence of local environmental damage and the lower production cost. However, this increase in instantaneous social welfare is lower than the increase in instantaneous net pro…t.
Optimal adoption dates
In this section, we will determine the optimal adoption dates. We still suppose that, in case where …rms adopt the clean technology at di¤erent dates, the …rst adopter is …rm 1 and the second adopter is …rm 2. Thus, in the following expressions, we suppose 1 2 . Sinceq a 1cd =q a 1cc andq a 2cd =q a 2dd , then U a 1cd = U a 1cc and U a 2cd = U a 2dd . This implies that the intertemporal net pro…t of …rm i can be written as depending only on i : However, since S a 1cd 6 = S a 1cc and S a 2cd 6 = S a 2dd because of crossborder pollution, the intertemporal social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 depend on 1 and 2 .
Each regulator chooses the socially optimal adoption date that maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function. Each …rm chooses the optimal adoption date that maximizes its intertemporal net pro…t.
The intertemporal social welfare of regulators 1 and 2, and the intertemporal net pro…t of …rm i are, respectively:
In order to get positive adoption dates, we need the following condition, which can be always veri…ed by choosing and/or m high enough: 3
The above condition means that the cost of immediate adoption of the clean technology is su¢ ciently high. It prevents …rms to immediately adopt (at date 0) the clean technology.
In the Appendix, we determine the optimal adoption dates which show that …rms adopt the clean technology simultaneously:
Proposition 2 Because of symmetry, when markets are separated, …rms adopt the clean technology simultaneously.
Inequality (17) and the fact that m > 1, enable us to make the following ranking:
We can state the following proposition: 3 Notice that the left expression of (21) is independent of parameters , m and r:
Proposition 3 The optimal adoption date for …rms is earlier than socially optimal.
The above proposition shows that socially optimal instantaneous regulation may not be dynamically optimal relatively to the adoption of clean technologies. This is due to the greater adoption incentives for …rms compared to those for regulators, under autarky. This is clearly demonstrated by the inequalities in (17) . This result is similar to that established by Ben Youssef (2010) who used a model comprising one regulator and a monopolistic …rm.
Paradoxically, if regulators desire that …rms delay their adoption to the socially optimal adoption date, they must compensate …rms for the losses they will incur by this adoption delay. If the intertemporal net pro…ts of …rm i are IU i ( a ) and IU i (^ a ) when the adoption dates are a and^ a , respectively, then the postpone adoption subsidy (compensation) is:
Proposition 4 When markets are separated, each regulator can push his …rm to delay its adoption of the clean technology by giving it a postpone adoption subsidy that compensates the …rm for the losses it will incur when this latter delays its optimal adoption date to the socially optimal adoption date.
Common market
When markets are opened to international trade (competition), the inverse demand function of the perfect substitute goods produced by …rms becomes P = a (q i + q j ). The size of the common market is a. The total consumers'surplus is equally divided between the two symmetric countries:
The emission-tax per-unit of pollution is t cm i and the per-unit production subsidy is s cm i : When …rm i uses the polluting technology, its pro…t is given by cm id = p(q i ; q j )q i dq i , and when it uses the clean technology, its pro…t is given by
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Instantaneous regulation
When both …rms use the polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare of regulator i is:
Maximizing the expression given by (27) with respect to q i gives the socially optimal production level with the polluting technology for regulator i:
Since …rm i constitutes a duopoly with …rm j and produces with pollution, it is regulated. A per-unit emission-tax is su¢ cient to induce the socially optimal level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net pro…t of …rm i is:
The socially optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces …rm i to producê q cm idd is:
When both …rms use the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare of country i is:
Maximizing the expression given by (31) with respect to q i gives the socially optimal production level with the clean technology for each regulator i:
Since the production process is clean, each regulator gives his …rm a per-unit production subsidy s cm icc , which is chosen to induce the socially optimal level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net pro…t of …rms i is:
The socially optimal per-unit production subsidy that induces …rm i to produceq cm icc is:
Considering that …rm 1 has adopted the clean technology and …rm 2 still produces using the polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 are, respectively:
Maximizing the expressions given by (35) and (36) respectively with respect to q 1 and q 2 gives:q cm 1cd = 2a + d 3c + e 4 > 0 (37)
Because of the second inequality of (6) and the …rst inequality of (1),q cm 2cd < 0: We conclude that considering the case where one …rm uses the clean technology and the other one uses the polluting technology is unrealistic. Let's notice that we have assumed the …rst inequality and the second inequality of conditions (1) and (6), respectively, to prevent the study of the complicated case where …rms adopt the clean technology at di¤erent dates. Indeed, even if it is possible to determine the optimal adoption dates when adoption is nonsimultaneous, their comparison is very di¢ cult in the common market case. Moreover, studying the case of non-simultaneous adoption is not the principal focus of the present paper. Non-simultaneous adoption of new and less-costly production technologies has been extensively studied by the industrial organization literature (Reinganum 1981 , Fudenberg and Tirole 1985 , Hoppe 2000 .
Proposition 5 Under a common market, due to conditions assumed on model's parameters, …rms adopt the clean technology simultaneously.
These inequalities enable us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Under a common market, the instantaneous gains from using the clean technology are greater for regulators than for …rms.
The reasons explaining the bene…t from the clean technology are the same than for the autarky case. However, when …rms compete in a common market, their instantaneous net pro…ts increase, due to the adoption of the clean technology, is less important than the increase of instantaneous social welfare levels.
Optimal adoption dates
When both …rms adopt the clean technology at the same date , the intertemporal social welfare of regulator i and the intertemporal net pro…t of …rm i are, respectively:
In the Appendix, we determine the socially optimal adoption date for regulators and the optimal adoption date for …rms, which are respectively:
Inequality (39) and the assumption m > 1, enable us to make the following ranking:
Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 When markets are opened to competition, the socially optimal adoption date is earlier than the optimal adoption date for …rms.
The above proposition shows that, even in a common market, socially optimal instantaneous regulation may not be dynamically optimal relatively to the adoption of clean technologies. This is due to the fact that, under a common market, the incentives to adopt the clean technology are greater for regulators than for …rms. This is clearly demonstrated by the inequalities in (39).
If regulators desire that …rms accelerate their adoption to the socially optimal adoption date, they must compensate …rms for the losses they will incur by an earlier adoption. If the intertemporal net pro…ts of …rm i are IU i ( cm ) and IU i (^ cm ) when adoption dates are cm and^ cm , respectively, then the earlier adoption subsidy (compensation) is:
In a common market, each regulator can push his …rm to accelerate its adoption of the clean technology by giving it an earlier adoption subsidy that compensates the …rm for the losses it will incur when this latter accelerates its optimal adoption date to the socially optimal adoption date. 13 
Autarky versus common market
Looking to expressions (22) and ( 42), we can show that: The above expression relative to the autarky case does not comprise the parameter explaining transboundary pollution. Thus, the socially optimal adoption date under autarky does not completely internalize transboundary pollution. However, the above expression relative to the common market case comprises the parameter , and shows that, under a common market, the socially optimal adoption date internalizes transboundary pollution. Moreover, we can verify that under both market regimes, optimal adoption dates for …rms do not completely internalize transboundary pollution. This is due to the fact that our damage function is linear with respect to total pollution. Indeed, socially optimal productions and net pro…ts of …rms do not completely internalize transboundary pollution. 4 This result is of great interest because this paper is the …rst attempt to link the adoption of clean technologies with transboundary pollution. Using a very di¤erent model than the present one, Ben Youssef (2009) showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of …rms on the common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. Moreover, the investment in absorptive R&D help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution (Ben Youssef 2011). We can state the following proposition:
The socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. It also better internalizes transboundary pollution compared with the optimal adoption date for …rms.
Let us notice that if there is no transfrontier pollution between countries, i.e., = 0, then from expressions (54) and (55), we deduce that the optimal adoption date for …rms and the socially optimal adoption date coincide under a common market ( cm =^ cm ). Indeed, since the instantaneous social welfare gain from using the clean technology internalizes transboundary pollution causing a speedup in technology adoption, the absence of transboundary pollution delays the socially optimal adoption date to the optimal adoption date for …rms. However, under autarky, the optimal adoption date for …rms still remains earlier than that socially optimal because this latter does not internalize transboundary pollution.
The socially optimal productions are the same under the two market regimes (q cm idd =q a idd ;q cm icc =q a icc ). Competition between …rms on the common market incites them to overproduce with the polluting technology compared to what is socially optimal, and this pushes regulators to increase their emission-tax (t cm idd > t a idd ). With the clean technology and under autarky, the optimal production for …rms is lower and very far from the socially optimal production, implying a great production subsidy; when markets are opened to international competition, the optimal production for …rms increases and the subsidy decreases (s a icc > s cm icc ). These results are interesting and even surprising because one may think that, to give a competitive advantage to its domestic …rm, each regulator reduces the per-unit emission-tax and increases the per-unit production subsidy, when markets are opened to international competition. Our results are di¤erent because regulators look for static …rst-best outcome. Ben Youssef (2009) found similar results with a di¤erent model in which regulatory instruments are a per-unit emission-tax and a per-unit R&D subsidy, and has showed that international trade increases the per-unit emission-tax and decreases the per-unit R&D subsidy.
Proposition 10 Opening markets to international competition increases the per-unit emission-tax when the polluting technology is used, and decreases the per-unit production subsidy when the clean technology is used.
In the Appendix, we show that the instantaneous social welfare gain from using the clean technology is greater under a common market than under autarky. Thus, opening markets to international trade speeds up the socially optimal adoption date (^ cm <^ a ). This is due to the fact that the socially optimal adoption date, under a common market, better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. Let us notice that if there is no transfrontier pollution between countries, i.e., = 0, then from expressions (46) and (54), we deduce that the socially optimal adoption dates are the same under both market regimes (^ cm =^ a ).
We also deduce that the competition of …rms on a common market reduces their instantaneous gain from using the clean technology compared to the case of separate markets. Thus, opening markets to international competition delays the adoption of the clean technology by …rms ( a < cm ):
Proposition 11 International competition reduces the instantaneous gain of …rms from using the clean technology. Consequently, …rms delay the adoption of the clean technology when markets are opened to international trade. However, the instantaneous social welfare gain from using the clean technology increases with market opening, leading to an acceleration of the socially optimal adoption date.
The above results are new and interesting because the impact of opening markets to international trade on the timing of adoption of clean technologies has not been previously studied.
Since opening markets delays the optimal adoption date for …rms, it leads to more global ‡ow of pollution when …rms are not incited to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal dates. However, since the socially optimal adoption date is lowered with international trade, then we have less ‡ow of pollution when …rms are incited to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal adoption dates.
Proposition 12 When …rms are not incited to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal adoption dates, international competition increases the global ‡ow of pollution. However, when …rms are given adoption subsidies, international competition reduces the global ‡ow of pollution.
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider two countries and a monopolistic …rm operating in each country. Firms produce the same homogeneous good by using a polluting technology that uses fossil energy. These …rms can adopt a new and clean production technology by incurring an investment cost. This clean technology uses a renewable energy and therefore has a lower per-unit production cost. Each …rm is regulated at each period of time, i.e., each regulator looks for static social optimality. A per-unit emission-tax is used when a …rm uses the polluting technology. A per-unit production subsidy, which can be considered as a …scal incentive, is used when a …rm uses the clean production technology. We study and compare the case where each …rm operates in a separate domestic market, and the case where …rms compete in the same common market formed by the consumers of the two countries.
Our results show that international competition increases the per-unit emissiontax when the polluting technology is used, and decreases the per-unit production subsidy when the clean technology is used. These results are interesting because one may expect that, with market opening, each regulator is tempted to give a competitive advantage to its domestic …rm by reducing the emission-tax and increasing the production subsidy.
In autarky both …rms adopt the clean technology simultaneously due to our symmetric model. However, in a common market, because of the competition between …rms, non-simultaneous adoption may occur. We impose conditions on the model's parameters to avoid the complicated case where …rms adopt the clean technology at di¤erent dates, and we show that this adoption is simultaneous. Indeed, although the determination of optimal adoption dates is possible, their comparison is theoretically very di¢ cult when adoption is not simultaneous.
Interestingly, the socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky, and than the optimal adoption date for …rms. Therefore, regulators should know how to intervene to get …rms adopting at the socially optimal dates. Under autarky, the instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is greater for …rms than for regulators. Consequently, …rms adopt earlier than what is socially optimal. Therefore, in autarky, regulators can induce …rms to adopt at the socially optimal adoption date by giving them postpone adoption subsidies. Interestingly, the behavior of regulators completely changes when markets are opened to international competition.
Indeed, under a common market, the instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is greater for regulators than for …rms. Consequently, the socially optimal adoption date is earlier than the optimal adoption date for …rms. Therefore, in a common market, regulators can induce …rms to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal adoption date by giving them speed up adoption subsidies.
Finally, international competition reduces the instantaneous bene…ts of …rms from using the clean technology. Consequently, …rms delay the adoption of the clean technology when markets are opened to international trade. However, the instantaneous social welfare bene…t from the adoption of the clean technology is greater under a common market, implying an earlier socially optimal adoption date compared with that under autarky. Consequently, international competition leads to more global ‡ow of pollution when …rms are not incited to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal adoption dates. However, with market opening, we have less global ‡ow of pollution when …rms are given adoption subsidies in order to adopt at the socially optimal adoption dates.
Let us notice that some of our interesting results are not due to pollution and can be added to the rich literature relative to industrial organization which considered that the new technology is characterized by a lower per-unit production cost. However, some other important results are due to pollution and /or transboundary pollution: i) the comparison of the per-unit emission-taxes in the two market regimes, ii) the better internalization of transboundary pollution by the socially optimal adoption date under a common market, iii) the socially optimal adoption date is lower under a common market than under autarky. It is also lower compared with the optimal adoption date for …rms. ii) Regulated …rms Sinceq a icc =q a 1cd , then by using expressions (7) and (12):
By changing the emission-tax t a idd and the production subsidy s a icc by their expressions in function ofq a idd andq a icc , we obtain: By using expressions ofq a 1cd andq a 1dd in the above bracketed expression, we show that:
The instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is higher for the …rst adopter …rm than for its regulator.
Optimal adoption dates
We suppose that 1 2 , meaning that, in case of non-simultaneous adoption, …rm 1 is the …rst adopter and …rm 2 is the second. i) Regulated …rms Firm i maximizes its intertemporal net pro…t IU a i ( i ) given by (20) with respect to i :
Because of m > 1 and condition (21), a > 0:
We have:
idd ) e r i (mr) 2 e mr i . Using the …rst-order condition given by (51), we get:
The second-order condition of optimality is veri…ed.
ii) Social optimum Each regulator maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function IS a 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) and IS a 2 ( 1 ; 2 ); given by (18) and (19), with respect to 1 and 2 ; respectively:
Equations (52) and (53) are respectively equivalent to:
Because of m > 1, condition (21), inequalities (50), equalities (48) and (49), we get^ a 1 > 0 and^ a 2 > 0: We have: 8 < :
)) e r 1 (mr) 2 e mr 1 @ 2 IS a 2 ( 1; 2) @ 2 2 = r (S a 2cc (q a 2cc ) S a 2cd (q a 2cd )) e r 2 (mr) 2 e mr 2
Using …rst-order conditions given by (52) and (53), we get:
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veri…ed for each regulator. Because of equality (48), we have:^ a 1 =^ a 2 =^ a :
Comparison of adoption dates
Inequality (50), the fact that U a 1cd U a 1dd = U a icc U a idd and m > 1, enable us to make the following ranking:
Under autarky, …rms adopt earlier than what is socially optimal. By changing the emission-tax t cm idd and the production subsidy s cm icc by their expressions in function ofq cm idd andq cm icc , we obtain:
U cm icc U cm idd = d c + e 2 (q cm icc +q cm idd ) > 0 (55)
Comparison of instantaneous gains
Using expressions (54) and (55), we obtain: S cm icc S cm idd (U cm icc U cm idd ) = eq cm idd > 0 Thus, we have the following ranking:
Under a common market, the instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is more important for regulators than for …rms.
Optimal adoption dates i) Regulated …rms
Each …rm i maximizes its intertemporal net pro…t IU cm i ( ) given by (41) with respect to : Because of m > 1, inequalities (61) and (21), cm > 0:
idd )e r (mr) 2 e mr : Using the …rst-order condition given by (57), we get: @ 2 IU cm i ( cm ) @ 2 = (1 m)m r 2 e mr cm < 0
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veri…ed. ii) Social optimum Each regulator i maximizes his intertemporal social welfare IS cm i ( ) given by (40) with respect to : Because of m > 1, inequalities (59) and (21),^ cm > 0:
idd )e r (mr) 2 e mr :
Using the …rst-order condition given by (58), we get @ 2 IS cm i (^ cm ) @ 2 = (1 m)m r 2 e mr^ cm < 0:
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veri…ed. 21 
Autarky versus common market
From expressions (46) 
